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Abstract
The issue of how to represent the "meaning" of an utterance is
central to the problem of computer understanding of natural language.
Rather than relying on ad-hoc structures or forcing the complexities of
natural language into mathematically elegant but computationally
cumbersome representations (such as first-order logic), this paper
presents a novel representation which has many desirable computational
ahd logical properties. It is proposed to use this representation to
structure the "world knowledge" of a natural-language understanding
system.
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1 The general problem-domain
This project is primarily concerned with the "representation
problem": How complex interrelated symbolic information can be
structured so that a computer can use it "intelligently". For this
project, the information to be structured is the "knowledge of the
world" which a person must bring to bear in order to understand some
simple natural language utterances (such as found in children's
stories), and the "intelligent" use of such information is exactly this
process of understanding. Following the lead of other Artificial
Intelligence research into the problem of natural-language
understanding (primarily Charniak [1972] and McDermott [1974a]), we can
consider the computer to have "understood" an utterance if it can
answer relevant questions from it.
For example, consider the following story fragment from
Charniak's thesis (the line numbers are for later reference):
(1) Fred was going to the store.
(2) Today was Jack's birthday
(3) and Fred was going to get a present.
Now consider some questions which might reasonably be asked: "Why did
Fred go to the store?", and "Who is the present for?" For a human
reader the answers are trivially obvious. However, in answering these
questions, a significant amount of "knowledge of the world" must be
used. The first question requires knowing that presents can be gotten
at stores (so that "going to get a present" is sufficient motivation
for "going to the store"), and the second requires knowing that one
often gives presents to another on his birthday, so that the present
which Fred is going to get is ultiiately to be given to Jack. Note
that none of this knowledge is even implicit in the story text (as it
would be if the story contained "Fred was going to the store in order
to buy a present for Jack"), and that the integration of the story
input with the world knowledge is so smooth that it seems to humans
that such information is in the story.
Also, note that line (3) out of context could mean that Fred is
whom the present is for (as in "Fred was happy because he was going to
get a present"). Thus one also needs to understand the "local
discourse context" in order to make sense of the story. Furthermore,
there must exist some sort of "global discourse context" which refers
to the general topic under discussion. The statement that "the group
had no identity" [Winograd 1971] is understood quite differently
depending on whether one is discussing mathematics or sociology.
Thus there appear to be several different kinds of knowledge
which must be used in order to understand even very simple utterances,
without even considering the need for potentially vast amounts of
traditional "linguistic" knowledge to handle syntax. Indeed, all the
natural-language systems referenced in this proposal use different
representations for each sort of knowledge used, and usually contain
many additional ad-hoc formats for storing certain kinds of
information.
2 The proposed solution-domain
What this project attempts is to express all these different
sorts of knowledge using a common representation. The appendix to this
proposal gives the philosophical and technical details of the proposed
representation as it is currently conceived, and should be consulted if
one wishes to verify the claims made for it here. The appendix also
compares this "constraint expression" (CE) representations to other
ones such as Planner (Hewitt 19681 and first-order logic.
2.1 Experts
The advantages and disadvantges of attempting to use a common
representation can be elucidated by comparing such an approach with the
"black box experts" approach. The "expert" paradigm says that for each
particular kind of problem involved in understanding language one
builds a self-contained "expert" program which contains the knowledge
necessary to solve it. The experts can call on other experts to solve
subproblems or pass the buck. These experts are "black boxes" in that
their internal workings are not public: The only access to the
knowledge each contains must be through some particular message-passing
protocol. Thus for example line (3) might have the expert for the word
"get" detect the ambiguity in "get a present" (either "receive oneself"
or "get to give to another"), and then it could call the "local
discourse" expert to see which of the two interpretations makes the
most sense. The local discourse expert might be able to resolve the
problem immediately, or it in turn might call other experts (perhaps to
do some deductive inference to decide whose birthday it is).
2. 2 Some history
This approach has many advantages (which it is why it is used
in the systems of Winograd [1971], Charniak [1972], and McDermott
[1974a]), among the most important of which is its modularity: One can
attack design problems one-at-a-time by building a new expert whenever
some new phenomenon has to be taken care of. Of course one problem is
that many of the old experts have to then be changed to include calls
upon this new expert -- after a while the interesting details of how
the knowledge is used become swamped by the details of the particular
communication protocols used between various pairs of experts.
Many years ago (when such experts were being coded in Fortran
or machine language), such. a "complexity barrier" was quickly reached,
which caused much interest in uniform logical representations such as
first-order logic. Such a uniform representation avoids the problem of
"who knows. what" by dumping all known facts into a homogeneous set of
axioms instead of hiding them in experts. Unfortunately, first-order
logic was designed to axiomatize the foundations of mathematics, not to
compute with. Anyway, partly in reaction to the Procrustean bed of
fi.rst-order aXiomatization, Hewitt designed some ways to lubricate the
interface between experts and thus free the system's designer from
having to consider all the low-level details of inter-expert
communication. The micro-Planner language and philosophy which
resulted [Sussman, Winograd,. and Charniak, 1970) allowed the creation
of such systems as Winograd's and Charniak's.
However, the complexity barrier was again reached -- being free
from concern with low-level interaction details, the designer could
concentrate on more intricate higher-level interactions, which in their
turn became too numerous and involuted to understand. Thus there is
again a push. for a more uniform type of formalism (See McDermott
[1974b) and Winograd [19741 for a deeper discussion of such issues. It
is only fitting that the designers of expert-based systems, who have
personally run into the complexity barrier, should have good insight
into the dimensions of the.problem). This of course does not entail a
return to mathematical logic -- it is clear that any new formalism must
be designed with great attention being paid to its computational
aspects (some of which are discussed in the appendix).
2.3 Advantages of a common representation
Apart from the historical cycle of section 2.2, there exist
sound methodological reasons for preferring a common representation in
the first place. For one thing, one of the main reasons why Winograd's
system is so outstanding is that it exploits the strong interactions
between the classically separate linguistic domains of syntax,
semantics, and pragmatics (world knowledge). Winograd's thesis contains
a goo.d discussion of why this is much better than the previously-used
techniques of "doing" the syntax of a sentence, taking all 4386
resultant parses,. and then "doing" semantics on each one to resolve the
ambiguities. By closely interweaving the syntactic, semantic, and
pragmatic analyses, one can vastly reduce the combinatorial explosions.
My thesis will not deal with the syntactic aspects of language, in that
it will use pre-parsed input such as McDermott and Charniak do. Thus
it will not -address the syntax-semantics interaction, but it will be
concerned with the semantics-pragmatics one (my solution of course
being that the "semantics" and the "pragmatics" can interact strongly
because they are essentially the same "kind" of knowledge -- linguistic
semantics is exactly the world-knowledge which we have about lexical
entities, represented in the same manner as other world knowledge. Some
details of this are given below).
Also, handling apparently different "kinds" of knowledge within
a common representation helps clarify how they interact. Just as using
a common representation for space and time allows relativistic physics
to explore interactions which would not otherwise be considered, so too
does the embedding of different "kinds" of knowledge in a common medium
allow an easier examination of their possibly interesting interactions.
3 The conceptual layers
The system to be computer-implemented as a result of this
project can be viewed in terms of six layers. The lowest layer consists
of mechanisms to do the CE label propagations (see appendix). At this
lowest level the system is committed to using a CE representation,
assuring the availability of the clean semantics and modularity
discussed in the appendix.
The second layer consists of the particular CE nodes which are
used. The appendix mentions the class-partition node, the singleton
node, the model-theoretic "world" node, the binary relation node, and
the typical-member node. These are all implemented in terms of the
previous level, and any new node types which may turn out to be
necessary can be similarly implemented, This layer is responsible for
the logical expressive power discussed in the appendix.
The third layer consists of "low-level constructs" such as
might be found as "primitives" in some logic. The appendix mentions
taxonomies, boolean connectives, Conniver-like "contexts" [McDermott
1973), domain-range restrictions, transitive relations, and N-ary
relations. These (and any new ones which are needed) are implemented
directly in terms of simple combinations of the level-two nodes.
The fourth layer consists of "high-level constructs" which make
a strong commitment regarding the ontology of the universe. Some of
these constructs are discussed in section 4. They consist of such
things as frames, defaults, states, events, and the .representation of
time. This layer also provides a mapping from linguistic entities (such
as nouns, adjectives, verbs, and case frames) into the appropriate
high-level constructs.
The fifth layer consists of the particular world-knowledge to
be encoded in terms of layers three and four. For example, to handle
the story fragment given in section 1, it is necessary to have
knowledge about children, birthdays, birthday parties, gift-giving,
gifts (such as where they are gotten), stores, "going", and "getting".
This knowledge will of course be expressed in a form which does not
bias it too heavily in favor of the particular examples used: For
instance, there will be knowledge of "going" in general, not just
knowledge of "going to the store". Section 4 gives some detailed
examples of such knowledge. The primary commitment of this layer is to
the particular domains of discourse used for examples in the thesis.
The sixth and topmost layer consists of a program to "use" the
CE data-base. The appendix discusses the CE data-base as a rather
passive storehouse of knowledge, which must be prodded by some user in
order to actually accomplish anything. In terms of the appendix, this
layer is responsible for creating new fragments of CE network (to
represent the story fragments), for setting up the different kinds of
initial labeling conditions, and for reacting to the results of the
label propagations (such as contradictions). This layer is the
interface between the CE data-base and the outside world. Thus this
layer's primary commitment is to the particular story fragments which
will be used as examples in the thesis (The kinds of high-level
processing which will be applied to these examples is illustrated in
section 4). Thus it should be possible to dissect the final system and
say that the stuff in layer si.x is particular to this one thesis, but
that the rest is of more general applicability.
Note that this topmost layer is fundamentally different from
the others. Layers one through five represent increasing levels of
structural complexity within the CE data-base. The top layer however
represents the the user of this data-base. It also provides a
convenient place to house the various ad-hoc processes which will
doubtlessly turn out to be necessary. Indeed, the ad-hoc stuff is
exactly that knowledge which can not (yet) be represented within the CE
data-base. For example, the fact that the high-level constructs do not
yet include "procedures" means that all procedural knowledge must be
housed here (or else that "procedures" must be implemented within
levels one through four). If a large mass such of ad-hoc material does
in fact accrete here, it will indicate the areas in which the existing
data-base scheme is deficient and thus provide a focus for possible
future work.
4 Using the high-level constructs
This section presents a rather detailed analysis of the kind of
knowledge structures which are needed in order to understand story
fragments such as the one given in section 1. What is desired is to
represent in the CE data-base both the hearer's pre-existing knowledge
(about birthday parties, etc.) and the knowledge which is conveyed by
the linguistic constructs in the story. Consider the sentence in line
(1): "Fred was going to the store."
4. 1 Entities (noun groups)
Line (1) describes an "event" (Fred going to the store)
involving two "entities" (Fred, and the store) and a time reference
(past progressive). Entities are represented by points (classes) in the
CE network. In this case, both entities are singular so they are
represented as singleton object classes, which we can call Fred-37 and
store-38. It is known that store-38 is indeed a store, so we need the
fact that store-38 is a subclass of all STORES. This is handled using a
partition node, which we will abbreviated here by [store-38 -+ STORES)
-- the brackets serve to delimit pieces of CE network from this
surrounding text. The fact that store-38 is the store instead of a
store gets into rather complex linguistic issues which will not be
dealt with here (but which will be discussed in the thesis). Now all we
know about Fred from the story is that it is an object named "fred":
The is handled by a binary relation node which says that the NAMIE-OF
Fred-37 is "fred". As a linear notation for this we will say
[<NAME-OF Fred-37 fred>], where "fred" is a point which represents the
name "fred" (as opposed to representing the objects which have that
name). Note that none of this says that Fred-37 is human or even is
even a physical object -- such facts are part of the hearer's pre-
existing knowledge which is already encoded in the data-base.
4.2 Events and the case-frame hierarchy
The event "going to" is more complex than the static entities.
One way of representing such an event is to use logical predicates,
such as (GO-TO Fred-37 store-38), which is in fact the approach taken
by Charniak's and McDermott's systems. Note, however, that there is
considerable question as to how many arguments such a GO-TO predicate
takes. In "Fred was going from his home to the store" we seem to need a
"source" argument; in "Fred was going to the store via Main Street" we
need a "path"; in "Fred was going to the store rapidly" we need a
"speed"; and so on. Now, this "variable number of arguments" problem
disappears in the CE representation: An N-ary relation is always
represented as a series of binary relations between the instance of the
relation and its arguments, For example, the class GOINGS represents
all instances of the ".going" relation. Then the instance in line (1)
is in this class, so we make up a new name (going-39) and state that
[going-39 - GOINGS]. To associate the arguments, we say something like
[<OBJECT-OF going-39 Fred-37>], [<DESTINATION-OF going-39 store-38>],
and so on (such as I<SOURCE-OF going-39 whatever>] if required).
Now in fact such structures are called "case frames" [Fillmore
1968] and are being used both by some linguists and some AI language-
understanding projects (see section 5). Note that the structure of the
CE representation itself (which is based on rather abstract, non-
linguistic considerations) has pretty much forced the re-invention of
such things. This kind of serendipity has occurred often with CE, and
is one of the reasons I am confident that this is a productive line of
research.
Now, it turns out that many verbs other than "going" have a
similar case structure in that they can take a source, destination,
path, object, etc: Consider "coming" "taking" "moving" "sending" and
"receiving". To capture this generalization, we can create the common
class PTRANS (for "physical transfers", following Schank [19721), and
have all these particular kinds of physical-transfer relations be
subclasses. In addition, each of the different kinds of PTRANS may have
additional information associated with it by using additional
arguments.
Furthermore, it turns out that all events have some structure
in common. Thus at the top of the hierarchy of events should be
something that captures the general structure of all events. Calling
this top point DOINGS, the common structures include "intensity"
modifiers ("He did it with vigor"; "He did it rapidly"), the time of
the event (which can be very complex, as in "he has been wanting to do
it for a week, already"), and the cause of the event.
4.3 Events and difference descriptions
However, we still need to deal with the internal structure of
events: What does it mean for an object to be PTRANSing from a source
to a destination? In general, I choose to model the meaning of events
in terms of state changes. A state can be represented by a CE "world":
Each state "contains" the facts which are true in that state. Thus
each event has associated with it a before state and an after state:
The before-state contains those facts which are true before the event
(but not after), and the after-state contains those facts which are
true after (but not before). Anything not mentioned in these states is
thus known to be unchanged by the event. So part of the structure for
PTRANS affirms that for every ptran-N which is in PTRANS, the
LOCATION-OF the OBJECT-OF ptran-N is the SOURCE-OF ptran-N in the
before-state, while it is the DESTINATION-OF ptran-N in the after-
state. That is, the meaning of an instance of PTRANS is that the object
changes location (where LOCATION-OF a physical object is a
representation of its physical location). The "for every ptran-N" in
the above description means that a typical-member node is used to say
this about a typical ptran-N, so that the description then applies to
all instances of PTRANS (which includes all instances of GOINGS,
TAKINGS, etc).
4.4 Events, Minsky's frames, and defaults
The general structure which has evolved in this discussion so
far can be described as follows: A complex relation (such as "physical
transfer") is represented via a class of all instances of it (PTRANS).
A typical-member node is used to describe the structure of a typical
member of the class (ptran-N). The attributes of the typical ptran-N
are specified by a series of binary relations (such as OBJECT-OF) which
specify the "arguments" to the complex relation. Furthermore, the
classes can be arranged in a hierarchy (or even more complex structure)
so that structurally similar complex relations can have their
similarities factored out and made explicit. This structure is in
effect an implementation of Minsky's [1974] idea of "frame systems", so
here is another instance of serendipity.
An additional aspect of Minksy's frames is that they employ
"defaults" -- each argument slot may have associated with it a "loosely
bound" (ie.. easily replaced) default value, which is to be used in the
absence of any other information. This use of defaults allows quick
"jumping to conclusions" with the later possibility of filling things
in more cautiously. The notion of "default" is closely related to those
of "exception" and "probability", and in fact the same CE mechanism can
handle all three. This mechanism uses the CE "world" construct to
impose an ordering on the "reliability" which the system assigns to any
particular. fact. The ordering is imposed using a subclass hierarchy,
such that world W1 represents more reliability than world W2 iff W1
contains W2 (ie. is a superclass). Section 5.4 of the appendix
discusses such hierarchies as a means of expressing orderings with
respect to transitive relations such as "on". Now, individual facts
are tied into this hierarchy using world nodes, such that if Wf is the
world of some fact and Wi is a world in the hierarchy, then [Wi + Wf]
means that Wf's fact is at least as reliable as Wi. That is, if what Wi
represents is reliable enough for a given purpose, then so is the fact
that Wf represents.
This can be made clearer by looking at the processing which
goes on within such a hierarchy. Since the higher reliability is
towards the top of the hierarchy, a +w label (see appendix) placed on a
point representing a given level of reliability (such as W2) can
propagate upwards to all levels of reliability which are known to be
"higher" than it (such as Wi). Furthermore, any world node having its
Wf contain such a W2 (as in [W2 - Wf]) will also be reached by the +w.
Thus we have hierarchy of "contexts" such that if some Wi is "enabled"
by putting +w on it, then all higher contexts and all facts implied by
such contexts will also be enabled; otherwise these facts will not be
enabled. Now, the +w label which is actually used is "+inf", which
means that these facts are to be enabled for the duration of the
current inference (appendix, section 4). Thus by starting this +inf at
different points in the reliability hierarchy, different sets of facts
can be enabled for use by the inference. So starting the +inf at a
lower point in the hierarchy will enable more facts than starting it at
a higher point (since a lower point such as W2 automatically propagates
its +inf to all higher points, but not conversely).
Now reconsider the issue of probability. By associating less-
probable facts with worlds lower in the hierarchy, they will only be
enabled when +inf starts at least that low. Thus the lower down the
+inf starts, ;the more "gullible" the system is in terms of allowing the
use of less-r~el.iable (low-probability) facts. This then allows the user
of the CE data-base (ie. layer 6) to set whatever level of gullibility
it desires. So :for first-pass crude processing it can use a very
gullible setting (which enables all the frame defaults), -and then
switch -to a less gullible setting whenever its suspicions are aroused
(as might be the case if there were a contradiction between a frame
default and other data). As more and more is known about something, the
system can afford to be less gullible in terms of accepting the truth
of vague generalizations (as embodied in the defaults), since it has
more "quality" data. to work from and can afford to ignore the defaults.
This same mechanism can handle hedged facts, such as "Most birds can
fly" or "The rain in Spain stays mainly in the plain" -- the facts are
simply given a world node which is assigned the proper place in the
reliability hierarchy.
4.5 Disambiguation -- Domain-Range restrictions
The preceding parts of this section have dealt with
representing information after it has been fully translated into the
proper'CE structures. This final part touches on the issue of semantic
disambiguation in order to examine part of the translation process
itself.
Consider the phrase "going to" in "Fred was going to the
store". Here, it clearly means a form of PTRANS, where the destination
is the physical location of the store. But in "Fred was going to his
doom", the destination is more a state (of Fred) rather than a physical
location. In "Fred was going to help me", the destination involves
participating in some other event (ie. helping me). Now a standard
linguistic analysis of this would conclude that there are (at least)
three different senses of "going to", and that it must be fully
diSambiguated before one can begin to understand a sentence in which it
occurs.
In opposition to such an analysis, I claim that all three
senses of "going to" are more similar to one another than they are
different -- much of the information conveyed by "going to" is the same
regardless of the context and "sense" in which it is used. This means
that the part of the meaning of "going to" which is common to all three
senses can be used as soon as "going to" is encountered -- one need not
wait for the phrase to be disambiguated before one can start drawing
some useful conclusions. For "going to", the major common meaning
involves the existence of a state in the future involving the object
(Fred) and the destination. Thus as soon as "going to" is encountered,
it is immediately known that its meaning involves such a future state.
Now, given that much, it is still necessary to distinguish
among the three senses as more information comes in. To name the three
disambiguated senses and the ambiguous one, let GOINGS-O be the
ambiguous form, and GOINGS-PHYSICAL, GOINGS-STATE, and GOINGS-EVENT be
the three senses in the order presented above. Part of the hearer's
world knowledge includes the fact that GOINGS-O is partitioned into the
three senses: Every instance of a frame for GOINGS-O is an instance of
exactly one of the disambiguated senses. The facts which are common to
all the senses (such as the use of a future state) are hung off
GOINGS-0; the facts peculiar to one sense are hung off that sense. When
"going" is firs~t encountered, a frame is set up as an instance of
GOINGS-0. Then "disambiguation" of this involves assigning the frame to
one of the more specialized senses. This can be accomplished using
domain-range restrictions (appendix, section 5). These would say that
[<DESTINATION-OF GOINGS-PHYSICAL PHYSICAL-OBJECTS>], [<DESTINATION-OF
GOINGS-STATE STATES>], and [<DESTINATION-OF GOINGS-EVENT EVENTS>]
respectively for the three senses. That is, the destination of a
GOINGS-PHYSICAL is always a physical object, and similarly for the
other two. As more information comes in, these restrictions force the
choice of one of the three senses. Suppose the destination turns out to
be "the store". Most things which the system knows about will be
arranged into a global taxonomy (such as figure 2-1 in the appendix).
In such a taxonomy, physical objects, states, and events will be
mutually exclusive. Now, "the store" is a store, which is indeed a
physical object. Thus it is not a state or an event, so the second and
third choice for the partition of GOINGS-0 are eliminated (they receive
-x labels). Thus GOINGS-PHYSICAL, the only remaining choice, is forced.
All this happens within the framework of CE label propagations -- no
other kind of processing is necessary.
The paradigm that comes out of such examples is that of
"incremental disambiguation" -- instead of something being
categorically "unambiguous" or "ambiguous", it is known to a greater or
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lesser amount of precision. Indeed, the whole idea of "unambiguous"
becomes faintly ridiculous -- there is always more which can be known
about any particular thing. The important criterion is that enough be
known about the thing in order to be able to make useful inferences.
5 Relation to. other work
One purpose of this research is to take several of the ideas
,about language understanding (and AI in general) which have appeared in
the last few years and to embed them in a semantically clean
representation, so that their interactions can be studied and
experimented with.
The general CE philosophy (layer 1) that computations should be
performed by pushing labels around a network has been derived from the
works of Lamb. [1966, 1969], Quillian [1967, 1969], and Waltz [1972].
Since all three of these systems involve local constraint propagation,
they share with CE the feature of modularity in both the logical and
computational senses (see appendix). However, unlike Lamb's and
Quillian's systems, CE has a clean semantic in terms of exactly what
the primitive labeling operations are, and how they interact. In
addition, unlike all three, CE has sufficient expressive power to
handle a very wide variety of logical inferences in a reasonably simple
manner. Of course these three systems were designed to meet different
goals from those embodied in CE, and to work in different domains.
Thus this research can be seen in part as an extension of such
techniques to a more complex domain. Also, like Waltz, I am attempting
to take a complex problem ("common sense" logical inference) and reduce
it to an essentially trivial algorithmic procedure, much as Waltz did
for his area of scene analysis.
The choice of the domain of natural language understanding in
general and childrens stories in particular represents a conscious
attempt to build on the work of Charniak [1972]. The two major
differences between this research and Charniak's are: (1) His was much
more ambitious, addressing a wide variety of linguistic and world-
knowledge issues, and (2) This research is interested in doing things
cleanly, while Charniak's pioneering efforts were quite properly
devoted to doing things at all. Many surface differences between
Charniak's work and this research ultimately derive from my desire for
"clean" solutions. That is also the major difference between this
research and that of McDermott [1974a), who also created a Charniak-
like system. For one thing, Charniak and McDermott used "procedural"
representations because such representations provide a lot of usable
power; I chose a "declarative" representation because it facilitates
understanding the underlying semantics of the representation and the
interactions between different chunks of knowledge.
Since Minsky's [1974] frame theory is also concerned with such
interactions from the standpoint of a basic representation, it is not
surprising that this research directly relates to his. Indeed, a large
portion of the work to be done on this project involves a reasonably
large-scale implementation of some of his ideas which have heretofore
not been embodied in executable computer programs.
The use of "difference descriptions" for representing events is
derived from Winston's thesis [1970). Using such descriptions makes
explicit the possibilities for an event changing something, and so may
be a good solution for the "frame problem" of McCarthy [McCarthy and
Hayes 1969].
The use of case analysis for verbs is currently a topic of
interest within the AI community. Martin's [1974] work on natural
language is a prime example, as well as the in-progress l. I. T. theses
of Mlitch Marcus and Cal Drake. Martin's system also exploits the
semantic commonalities of different word senses discussed in section
4. 5 -- the meaning of "put an idea in one's head" has many similarities
to that of the physical sense of "put into".
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Data Base Applications of Constraint Expressions
Appendix
CONTENTS
1 Introduction
1.1 Goals 27
1.2 Details 31
2 Taxonomies
2.1 Other representations 32
2. 2 The CE representation 33
3 Syllogistic logic
3.0 Introduction 36
3.1 Universal affirmations: "all A are B" 36
3.2 Universal negations: "no A are B" 37
3.3 Existential affirmations: "some A are B" 37
3.4 Existential negations: "some A are not B" 41
4. Propositional logic
4.0 Introduction 43
4.1 Model theory: Propositions as classes 43
4. 2 Union, intersection, etc. 44
4.3 Using the data-base (with an example) 45
4.4 Implication revisited -- representing models explicitly 47
4.5 Logical consistency and completeness 52
5 Functions and relations
5. 1 Binary relations: Image 56
5.2 General domain-range specification 58
5.3 Constraint propagation 58
5.4 Transitive relations 60
5.5 A comparison with Codd's system and Planner 64
5.6 N-ary relations 66
5.7 Inverse relations -- "active" and "passive" 69
6 Logical quantification
6.1 Implicit quantification 71
6.2 Explicit quantification 72
6.3 Nested quantification 75
7 Summary 78
Figures
Appendix
1 Introduction
1.1 Goals
This appendix introduces a representation for information,
based on "constraint expressions" (CEs). This CE representation has
evolved (over the last year or so) in response to the following three
design goals:
First, The representation should be "natural" with respect to
the domain of information which is to be expressed. By that fuzzy,
overworked term I mean that the representation should be a positive
help in structuring the domain's information in useful ways, instead of
being a hindrance. In particular, things which are structurally similar
in the domain should be structurally similar in the representation. For
example, LISP is a far more natural representation for recursive symbol
manipulation algorithms than a universal Turing machine is, in part
because LISP's control structures allow one to write structurally
similar programs for structurally similar algorithms: All algorithms
with the same general form "chew down a list and perform a common
operation on each sublist" can be naturally written using the same
recursive structure. With Turing machines, however, one would be hard
pressed to find any similarity among the representations of such
algorithms. Of course, in a different domain (such as automata-
theoretic proofs) the Turing machine might turn out to be the more
"natural" representation. Therefore, since "naturalness" is a function
of the domain, it is necessary to explain the intended domain for the
CE representation.
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Broadly speaking, the intended domain is that of "natural
language understanding." In particular, the CE representation forms
the basis of my forthcoming S.M. thesis, which deals with the
understanding of the sort of discourse found in children's stories.
Now, interesting structural similarities show up in natural language
because the same locally meaningful structure (such as a noun phrase)
can occur as a constituent in many different higher-level structures.
Now, since the meaning of a structure (such as "Macy's employees") is
pretty much independent of where this structure fits in to some higher-
level structure, the representation of such a meaning should have this
same property. That is, "Macy's employees" should be represented the
same in all of: "John Doe is one of Macy's employees"; "Is John Doe one
of Macy's employees?"; and "List the Macy's employees who will retire
this year." By representing the constituents (such as "Macy's
employees") the same, the structural similarities among these three
sentences are directly reflected in the representation. This emphasis
on "local meaningfulness" means that the CE representation is highly
modular, and that all channels for interaction are represented
explicitly in the data-base. Also, the fact that statements, questions,
and commands are all represented in the same manner is one of the
powerful features of the CE representation -- this appendix mentions
some of the limitations found in some representations which do not have
such a feature.
The second design goal is that the representation must have
sufficient expressive power, in a computational as well as abstract
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logical sense: It does no good to have an abstractly "powerful"
representation if it is computationally difficult to use it. First-
order logic is the canonical example of a computationally poor
representation -- the time required to compute an inference grows
exponentially with the complexity of the inference and the amount of
available information (in the form of axioms). This seems rather
strange, in that the more one knows, the easier it should be to answer
questions. Thus the emphasis in this appendix is more on the
computational aspects of the CE representation, rather than its purely
logical ones.
However, this is not to slight the desirability of having a
deep theoretical understanding (logical as well as computational) of
the representation. Sadly, it often seems that there are two opposing
factions working on the representation problem: On one side are some
logicians, who are almost exclusively concerned with achieving a deep
understanding of their representations; on the other side are some
computer scientists, who concentrate on achieving computational power
without much understanding of the underlying semantics. The
disadvantage of such computer hacking is that when something works (or,
more often, doesn't), it is very difficult to glean more general
information such as "why", or "where exactly is the weak link."
Indeed, I personally made the greatest progress with CE when I
stopped hacking for a while and attempted to discern the basic
semantics of what was really happening. Doing this was facilitated by
the third design goal, which is that the basic representation should
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have a clean semantic base by using the possibly complex interactions
of a few simple primitives, rather than on primitives which are
themselves inherently complex. The fact that the representation
concentrates on "local meaningfulness" is a big help here, since that
implies that the global semantics of an expression can be easily
analyzed in terms of the local semantics of the primitives. (Another
reason for the third design goal is that I eventually plan to use the
representation for complex learning tasks, which would be nigh well
impossible if the primitives are too complex. The features of CE which
relate to learning are beyond the scope of this document). Finally, a
system with a simple semantic base is much easier to implement (Just
compare the compilers for LISP and PL/II).
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1.2 Details
Section 2 presents the basic ideas behind CE by using it to
represent taxonomies. This representation for taxonomies is compared
with first-order logic, Planner (Hewitt 1968, Sussman 1970], and Codd's
relational data-base scheme [Date & Codd 1974].
Section 3 slightly extends the CE representation of section 2
to handle all Aristotelian syllogisms. Procedures for finding all the
individuals with a given property are presented.
Section 4 extends the representation of section 3 to handle all
of propositional (0-order) logic. The nature of the model theory for
this logic is examined, with references to the problems of consistency
and completeness.
Section 5 extends section 4 to handle binary relations (in
terms of mappings). It is shown how the CE representation can easily
handle transitive relations. The obvious extension to N-ary relations
is discussed. Some examples are presented, and compared with Codd-like
representations.
Section 6 extends section 5 to handle arbitrarily nested
quantifications, giving CE the logical expressive power of oarga-order
logic and the attendant necessity for brute-force processing. Some
brute-force examples are presented, and it is explained why such
complexity has up to this point not been needed.
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2 Taxonomies
2. 1 Other representations
Figure 2-1 shows an example of a taxonomic classification of
physical objects. The asterisks (called points) represent classes of
objects. The constructions connecting the points are partition nodes
-- each signifies that the classes below the bar form an exclusive and
exhaustive partition of the class above the bar. (The "..." indicates
that a partition node has other subclass points which are not shown).
For example, the class of LIVING things is partitioned into exactly the
three subclasses of PLANTS, ANIMALS, and WEIRDIES. Now, the visual
connectivity of the figure makes it very easy for humans to draw
certain kinds of conclusions from it. For example, it is obvious that
all redwoods are plants, since the class of redwoods is a subclass of
trees is a subclass of plants. Also, no redwoods are bacteria, since
all redwoods are plants, all bacteria are weirdies, and plants and
weirdies are mutually exclusive.
In general, the problem of representing taxonomies is an
important one, for at least three reasons. First, humans do it well and
do it often: Biologists classify specimens; programming language
designers define data-types ("numbers" are partitioned into "integer,"
"real," and "complex."); operations analysts (among others) use
decision trees; and the notion of "subclass" alone appears often in
various formalisms -- for example, Codd [Date & Codd 1974, p. 241
would like to be able to state that "everyone who supplies any part is
a known supplier".
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Noting that Codd's formalism has trouble even with simple
subclass, let us consider how some other formalisms handle taxonomies.
This is the second reason for interest in taxonomies: Most formalisms
do it poorly. Consider first-order logic. The partitioning of LIVING
things into PLANTS, ANIMALS, and WEIRDIES can only be done by something
like this:
Yx [LIVING(x) E PLANT(x) v ANIMAL(x) v WEIRDIE(x)]
Vx E[PLANT(x) A ANIMAL(x)]
Vx -[ANIMAL(x) A WEIRDIE(x)]
Vx -[PLANT(x) A WEIRDIE(x)]
The first line of this seems alright -- the problem is that we need all
those negation assertions. Indeed, a theorem prover would find it not
completely trivial to prove "no redwoods are bacteria", which is
annoying since there clearly does exist a trivial procedure ("following
the lines", as was done above). Representing the above facts in Planner
is even worse, because Planner-like languages do not even have a built-
in negation mechanism, usually relying on something to the effect that
"if I can not prove it is true, then it is false."
The third and most important reason for discussing taxonomies
here is that the CE representation (which is about to be explained)
does in fact represent and process them efficiently.
2.2 The CE representation
Consider the process of putting individual objects into the
various classes (represented by points) in figure 2-1. Let names in all
lowercase letters denote particular objects (while uppercase names
still denote classes). We will "put objects in classes" by labeling the
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classes with the names of the objects: For an object "x" and a class
"C", let the label "+x" on C mean that x is in C; let the label "-x" on
C mean that x is not in C. Clearly, it is contradictory to label C
with both "Ox" and "-x"
Now, if the diagram in 2-1 consisted of just the points, with
no partition nodes, there would be complete freedom in labeling any
particular point "+x" or "-x" (but not both) without fear of
contradiction. By including the partition nodes in the diagram, what we
do is constrain the possible patterns of labeling the points, hence a
partition node is a kind of "constraint expression". For example, if +x
is on TREES, it is constrained to also be on PLANTS (since all trees
are plants). Thus the more we know (in terms of additional
constraints), the fewer arbitrary interpretations we can make. In
general, figure 2-2 enumerates the four ways (tl thru t4) in which a
partition node can apply a constraint and force the propagation of
label assignments:
(tl) If one subclass is labeled +x, then the superclass must
be labeled +x and all other subclasses must be labeled -x. For if an
object is in one partitioning subclass of the superclass, then it is
clearly in the superclass itself, and can not be in any of the other
mutually exclusive subclasses.
(t2) If the superclass is labeled -x, then all subclasses must
be labeled -x. For if an object is not in the superclass itself, it can
not be in any subclass.
(t3) If the superclass is labeled +x, and all-but-one of the
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subclasses are labeled -x, then the remaining subclass must be labeled
+x. For if an object is in the superclass and is definitely not in all-
but-one of the subclasses, then it must be in the remaining subclass.
(t4) If all the subclasses are labeled -x,' then the superclass
must be labeled -x. For if an object is not anywhere in the exhaustive
partitioning of the superclass, then it is not in the superclass.
Note that tl and t3 are in some sense "duals", as are t2 and
t4. Also note that another way of looking at the partition node
constraints is to say that a partition node makes certain labelings
illegal. Figure 2-3 shows the three basic illegal labelings around a
partition node, from which one can indeed derive ti thru t4.
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3 Syllogistic logic
3.0 Introduction
The purpose of this section is to show in rather gory detail
some of the interesting processing that can be applied to a CE network
in order to answer questions. The framework of Aristotelian syllogistic
logic was chosen for this section because the inferences are easy for
humans to follow, and the inferences are easy for the CE representation
to compute.
3. 1 Universal affirmations: "all A are B"
Given the label propagating machinery of the previous section,
it is trivial to do syllogistic inferences of the form "all REDWOODS
are TREES, all TREES are PLANTS, thus all REDWOODS are PLANTS" (see
figure 2-1). One method is to initially label REDWOODS with +x. Then,
by tl, label TREES with +x. Finally, by tl again, label PLANTS with +x.
Now, since "x" is an arbitrary redwood, we know any arbitrary redwood
is a plant; ie. all redwoods are plants.
Since the use of such "arbitrary" objects can be confusing, I
prefer a different method of doing such inferences. Assume that the
statement is false. Thus there is at least one redwood which is not a
plant. Without loss of generality, call it "x" -- "x" is now that
particular (although unknown) redwood. So, label REDWOODS with +x
(since by hypothesis x is a redwood), and label PLANTS with -x (since
by hypothesis x is not a plant). By propagating the labels as above, we
get +x on PLANTS. But, this is a contradiction: x can not both be a
Appendix
plant and not be a plant. Thus the initial hypothesis must be
incorrect, so indeed all redwoods must be plants. Note that instead of
using ti to push the +x from REDWOODS to PLANTS, we could just as well
have used t2 to push the -x from PLANTS to REDWOODS, or we could have
used both and let the contradiction occur somewhere in between (at
TREES, in this case).
3.2 Universal negations: "no A are B"
Similarly, label propagation can handle syllogisms involving
negation: "All trees are plants, no weirdies are plants, thus no trees
are weirdies (and no weirdies are trees)". As above, assume the
conclusion is false. Then there exists something which is both a tree
and a weirdie. Call it "x". Label both TREES and WEIRDIES with +x.
Then, by tl, propagate the +x to PLANTS. Then, by ti, +x on PLANTS
constrains there to be -x on WEIRDIES. Since WEIRDIES is now both +x
and -x, we have the contradiction, so the hypothesis is false. Thus no
trees are weirdies. As above, different orders of applying constraints
can cause the point of contradiction to occur at different places.
3.3 Existential affirmations: "some A are B"
Consider: "Some employees are felons, all felons are crooks,
thus some employees are crooks". As above, the goal is to represent the
premises as a network of constraint expressions, and then prove the
conclusion by setting up an appropriate initial labeling. However, a
network consisting solely of partition nodes can not make existential
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statements: Given a network with a point representing the class of
EMPLOYEES, nothing prevents that class from being completely empty. The
partition node provide constraints of the form "if an object is in one
of the subclasses, then it must be in the superclass and not be in any
other subclass" -- nothing says that there has to in fact be an object
there at all, but only that if there is one then it must be in the
superclass, etc.
Thus we need a new kind of constraint, one which insists that
there in fact be an object (or objects) in a particular class. We do
this by making special note of classes containing exactly one object.
Such singleton classes are represented by network "points" which are
drawn as small squares. As an example, figure 3-la says that there are
exactly three EMPLOYEES -- Smith, Jones, and Lee. In keeping with the
convention of naming objects with lower-case letters, points
representing singleton classes are given lower-case names (except
perhaps for the first letter).
Two details need to be emphasized about this particular
formalism for objects. First, like OWL [Martin 1974], this formalism
does not consider objects to be set-theoretic elements of classes, but
rather to be classes themselves (with the added property of being
singletons): "The object 'Smith' is in the class EMPLOYEES" is
represented as a subclass relation and not a class-membership one. Thus
this is a "one level" system -- it is impossible to have classes whose
'elements' are themselves classes, whose elements in turn .... This
eliminates a counter-intuitive source of conceptual complexity
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(consider Russell's paradox), without harming the system's usable
power.
The second detail is that two distinct object-points in a
network do not necessarily represent distinct objects. Just as two non-
object classes can be the same (for example, when each is constrained
to be a subclass of the other), so may two object classes be
constrained to be the same. The fact that two (or more) objects are
distinct must be represented explicitly. In figure 3-1a, the three
employees are constrained to be mutually exclusive with each other, and
hence are distinct. In figure 2-1, any objects which appear at the
bottom of such a taxonomy will all be distinct by virtue of the
hierarchy of mutual exclusions which connect them. Thus there is little
overhead in requiring explicit representation of object distinctness,
while allowing for the case that superficially 'distinct' points in a
network really represent the same object (such as "the morning star"
and "the evening star").
Now, figure 3-1b represents the premises that some particular
employee (arbitrarily named 'empl') is a felon, and that all felons are
crooks. Note that in a representation such as Planner or Codd's, two
atomic objects are always considered to be distinct if they have
different print-names. Thus "empl" would considered to be distinct from
all of Smith, Jones, and Lee; while in 3-1b it is clear that "empl" is
in fact exactly one of those three. Now, since all known objects are
represented explicitly in the CE data-base, the problem of showing that
there exists some employee who is a crook is equivalent to finding one
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(or more) such objects. That is, we need to find an object which is
both an EMPLOYEE and a CROOK. We of course know that the desired
object is 'empl', but the problem is to implement the necessary
inferences in terms of label propagations. Several such implementations
are possible.
The obvious brute-force technique is to enumerate all the
objects in the data-base and test each one. Testing an object is easy:
To see if an object is an employee, mark the object +x, mark EMPLOYEES
-x, and look for a contradiction during the label propagation.
Similarly, we can test the object to see if it is a crook. Of course,
for a large data-base on conventional hardware such a scheme would be
much too expensive.
One way to eliminate this brute-force enumeration in some cases
is to keep a "short term memory" of objects recently mentioned or
created. Then if the conclusion is presented immediately after the
premises are given, 'empl' can be tried immediately. However, in a real
data-base application it is usually necessary to answer questions using
information that is not explicitly mentioned, and hopefully without
using brute-force enumeration.
So, instead of enumerating everything known and testing each
one for employeehood and crookedness, it would be much better to
enumerate only the known employees (or known crooks), and then test
each of these for crookedness (or employeehood). Enumerating all the
objects in a class (such as EMPLOYEES) is easy: Label EMPLOYEES with
-x, then and every object to which a -x propagates is a known employee.
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In this case, the -x will propagate (using t2) to all of Smith, ,Jones,
Lee, and empl. To show that every object which is reached by a -x is in
fact an employee, attempt the inference for the general case: Label
any found object (Jones, for example) with +x, and label EMPLOYEES with
-x. Then clearly a contradiction will occur, since the -x label can
propagate from EMPLOYEES to the found object (which is labeled +x).
Thus the object is a subclass of EMPLOYEES (by the reasoning used for
showing "all A are B"). This proves that all found objects are indeed
employees, but does not prove that all employees will be found --
section 4 contains a brief discussion of this issue of "completeness".
A final way of finding crooked employees is to do the
enumerations in parallel: Label EMPLOYEES with -x, and CROOKS with -y.
Any object which is reached by both these labels is by necessity both
an employee and a crook. Note that this is less efficient for
sequential hardware than the previous technique is, but it is not hard
to envision various asynchronous processing schemes (using cellular
automata) which make the parallel-enumeration approach win.
3.4 Existential negations: "some A are not B"
The machinery of the previous subsection can also handle
syllogisms such as: nSome employees are felons, all felons are crooks,
no good-guys are crooks, thus some employees are not good-guys".
Figure 3-1c adds this constraint that no good-guys are crooks (ie. they
are mutually exclusive classes). All the techniques for existential
affirmations apply here too. For example, we can enumerate all
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employees as before, and test them to see if they are not good-guys (by
deriving a contradiction from labeling both the found employee and
GOOD-GUYS with +x). This is analogous to the handling of universal
negations in 3.2. Similarly, to enumerate the non-good-guys, start a +x
at GOOD-GUYS and use all objects which are reached by -x. The proof
that this works is isomorphic to that in 3.3.
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4 Propositional logic
4.0 Introduction
This section uses the CE representation to handle the full
range of propositional (0-order) logic. The same processes which apply
for simple syllogisms also apply here, although the complexity of the
interacting label propagations increases as the complexity of the data-
base does.
4.1 Model theory: Propositions as classes
Propositional logic deals with 'propositions' (abbreviated by
the letters P and Q), each of which has a 'truth value' (true, or
false). The 'propositional connectives' (negation, conjunction,
disjunction, implication, etc.) are considered to be functions on the
domain of truth values: For example, the compound proposition "P and
Q" (or PAQ) has a truth value of "true" iff both P, Q have truth values
of true. We shall see later on how this somewhat obscure notion of
"truth function" can be better interpreted in terms of "constraints".
For now, consider that CEs deal with classes, not propositions,
so it is necessary somehow map all propositions into classes. This is
done by traditional model theory: The class corresponding to a
proposition is that of all the possible worlds (models) in which the
proposition is true. Then, the propositional connectives become
operations on classes. For example, the class corresponding to PAQ is
the intersection of the class for P with the class for Q. That is, PAQ
is true in exactly those worlds where both P is true and Q is true.
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Similarly for PvQ, and -P. PnQ deserves special mention because it can
be represented as "P is a subclass of Q", which is a single partition
node. However, class relations corresponding to the other connectives
are not quite so simple.
4.2 Union, intersection, etc.
The following list of class relations specifies for each one
what behavior (in terms of propagating labels) it should have:
Intersection (PnQ), figure 4-1a.
(i1) If +x on both "inputs", then propagate +x to the "output".
(12) If +x on the output, propagate +x to both inputs.
(13) If -x on either input, propagate -x to the output.
Union (PuQ), figure 4-1b.
(ul) If -x on both inputs, propagate -x to the output.
(u2) If -x on the output, propagate -x to both inputs.
(u3) If +x on either input, propagate +x to the output.
Note that union and intersection are exact duals, as expected.
Complement (4P), figure 4-1c.
(cl) If +x on either side, propagate -x to the other.
(c2) If -x on either side, propagate +x to the other
These (plus the subclass relation) correspond to the standard
primitive connectives used in propositional logic. All of the 16
possible boolean connectives can be made from this (redundant) set of
primitives. One additional class relation deserves mention, because it
points out the distinction between viewing class relations as
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"functions" and viewing them as "constraints". This relation is that of
"exclusive or": An object is in PQQ iff it is in P, or in Q, but not
in both. For any two arbitrary classes P and Q, PVQ contains exactly
those objects which are in exactly one of them. This is also the
behavior of a partition node, except that with a partition node the two
"inputs" are additionally constrained to in fact have no objects in
common. Thus the "function" viewpoint takes arbitrary "inputs" and
produces some "output" (which is constrained to bear the appropriate
relationship to the inputs); the "constraint" viewpoint abhors
arbitrariness because that loses propagation information. Indeed, the
addition of all the class relations of figure 4-1 is just a notational
convenience: Each of them may be defined in terms of a small network of
partition nodes (using 3 or fewer nodes); they add no new expressive
power to the CE representation. Soperhaps the centuries-long gap
between syllogisms and modern propositional logic would have been
considerably shorter if Aristotle had picked the right primitives!
4.3 Using the data-base (with an example)
The techniques for using a general propositional-logic CE data-
base are an extension of those for processing syllogisms, A syllogistic
data-base presumably contains a large number of syllogistic 'facts'
(such as "no good-guys are crooks") in the form of CEs. The user then
queries the data-base by providing syllogistic statements which the
system is to prove or disprove (including the case of proving something
exists by actually finding one). Note that the 'facts' are represented
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by CEs, while the users 'queries' are represented by imposing initial
labelings on the network and watching for interesting conditions (such
as a contradiction) to occur during the constrained label propagations.
It is important that the 'facts' and 'queries' have exactly the same
expressive power, even though they are represented differently (facts
as pieces of network, queries as initial labelings). This means that
anything which the user can put into the data base he can later get
out, and conversely.
However, the use of the boolean class relations allows one to
express complex 'facts' as CEs which can not be represented as simple
initial labelings. For example, the right-hand side of figure 4-2
expresses the facts that the class of fortunate-ones is exactly the
union of the classes of wise-ones and lucky-ones, and that all
unfortunate-ones are unhappy-ones. Now suppose the user wishes to know
if everyone who is both unlucky and unwise is therefore unhappy. This
can be represented in terms of a simple initial labeling by
constructing the intersection class (named C here) of unlucky-ones and
unwise-ones, and then asking if "all C are unhappy-ones". The left side
of figure 4-2 shows this construction, and the initial labeling (+x on
C, -x on UNHAPPY-ONES). This inference does indeed succeed. One way of
producing the contradiction is as follow: The +x on C yields +x on both
Al and A2 by constraint 12; +x on Al yields -x on WISE-ONES by cl;
similarly, +x on A2 yields -x on LUCKY-ONES; then these two -x labels
yield -x on FORTUNATE-ONES by ul; this yields +x on UNFORTUNATE-ONES by
c2, finally yielding +x (and a contradiction) on UNHAPPY-ONES by tl.
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Although cumbersome to write out in English, the derivation can
be done quite simply by actually marking the appropriate +x and -x
labels directly on the network diagram. This is of course how a
computer implementation can do it (where "marking" means "add the label
to the list associated with this class-point"). Note that this is not
how traditional logic does such inferences: Theorem proving involves
applying "rules of inference" to a large bag of axioms and derived
statements, putting the derived results of the rules into the bag in
turn (where they may then be used as input to the inference rules....)
Thus theorem proving creates and copies items which are much more
complex than the simple CE labels. Also, note that the inference of
figure 4-2 includes the derivation of one of DeMorgan's laws (that
[-P A -Q] 2 -[PvQ]), for which most logical systems have to generate
rather long proofs.
4.4 Implication revisited -- representing models explicitly
One item which has been glossed over so far is the issue of
nested implications. Propositions such as [Pn[QmR]] [[PmQ] [PnR]],
although ugly, actually do appear in standard treatments of logic. (In
fact, this thing is actually an axiom of a system presented by
Mendelson [1964]). However, using the subclass relation for implication
does not allow such nesting, since a "logic box" (like those in figure
4-1) for a nested implication needs to connect to three points, while
the subclass relations just connects to two. This subsection discusses
human intuitions about nested implications, presents an intuitively
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satisfactory representation for them, and discusses ramifications of
this representations in terms of "context", and knowledge about
knowledge. This representation is also used in section 6, dealing with
nested quantifications.
One way of allowing nested implications is to represent all
nested ones by using the boolean truth-function for implication, while
still representing the top-level implications using the subclass
relation. This does not seem satisfactory for two reasons. First, any
use whatever of the implication truth-function goes against my
intuitive understanding of what "implication" is, anyway. I balk at
the idea that P3Q "really means" the truth-function [(P]vQ: I vastly
prefer "If I am getting wet then it is raining" over "Either I am not
getting wet, or it is raining, or both". Now this might just be an
artifact of English, but I doubt it. Second, note that 'right-nestings'
of implication seem much "simpler" than 'left-nestings', although the
truth-functional representation does not make any distinction. An
example of a right-nesting is "If it is raining, then if I am outside
then I am getting wet"; a sample left-nesting is "If it is true that if
I am outside then I am getting wet, then I should not be outside".
Now, the only reason for mentioning these objections to truth-
functional implication is that there is a good CE representation for
nested implications to which the objections do not apply: It still
uses the subclass relation (even for nested implications), and right-
nestings are processed differently from left-nestings.
This representation allows an explicit correspondence between
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the proposition that "A is a subclass of B" and the class of models for
that proposition. Figure 4-3a shows the representation for this: It
states that M1 is the class of all worlds in which A is a subclass of
B. This kind of CE is is called a "world node". Now, let P, Q, and R be
world-classes as above. Then figure 4-3b represents Rz[PzQ], while
4-3c represents [PmQ]zR. Note that M2 and M3 are each a world-class
for a subclass relation between the world-classes P and Q. Thus it is
possible to nest these to any depth, although the label propagating
computations get more involved as the depth increases.
Before examining these computations, consider what the objects
in the world-class M1 represent. Each corresponds to one possible world
wherein it is true that A is a subclass of B. Logically speaking, each
world (or "model") has an "interpretation" which associates with each
class in the network exactly those objects which it contains (in that
world). However, for our purposes it is not necessary to be this
precise, so we can consider a "world" to be a "possible universe" or
"situation" in the physical (and metaphysical) sense. Note that the
world-classes need not be finite or even denumerable: We are only
interested in how world-classes relate to each other, not in their fine
structure.
These world-classes have many uses which are beyond the scope
of this appendix to discuss in detail, but which are mentioned here to
give some concrete examples. First, different physical situations can
be modeled as world-classes. One can consider an "event" to be
something that changes the world, so each event has associated with it
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a "before" world-class and an "after" one. The data-base can hold
different facts about these different worlds, so it is possible to
answer questions about the past and about hypothetical futures (perhaps
based on proposed courses of action). Second, different states of
knowledge can be represented by different world-classes. By associating
a world-class with each sentient being, it is possible to explicitly
represent what the being does and does not know about something (Such
as "John knows Bill's phone number, but I don't think that Bill
realizes it"). Of course, the different beings can be the same being
at different times: "Yesterday I learned .... " As a final example,
different worlds can represent different "contexts" of information
within the data-base. If it is known that some desired information is
in a particular context (such as "mathematics context" or "Macy's
payroll register context"), then it is more efficient to only propagate
labels within that context. Such a context world-class operates by.
"enabling" parts of the data-base (and perhaps explicitly disabling
other parts).
Indeed, this "enabling" operation is exactly how labels
propagating thru world-classes can affect things. To allow a label to
be distinguished on the basis of which world is responsible for
generating it, associate with each label a "world tag". When putting an
initial labeling on the CE network, use the world tag "inf" (for
"current inference"). Each world tag can also act as a label in its own
right (in which case it, too, is associated with a world tag of its
own). To clarify this, consider the example in figure 4-3d. We want to
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infer that [PnQ][P3Q]. This is a nice example because it is trivial
yet it shows the processing for both left-nesting and right-nesting. M4
is the world-class for the left-hand P3Q and M5 is the world-class for
the right-hand one. Thus to infer [PnQ]=[PnQ] we must show that M4=MS.
To show that M4 is a subclass of M5, mark M4 with +x and MS
with -x, and attempt to derive a contradiction. The world tags for the
+x and -x are both "inf": We write +x/inf and -x/inf when it is
necessary to show the world tag. The +x sitting on M4 means that the
associated inference (P4Q) is true in the world "x"; the -x sitting on
M5 means that its associated inference (also P=Q) is false in the world
"x". This is clearly a contradiction, but there remains the task of
showing how the label propagating system can realize it. This is
accdamplished by further processing of the -x label. The -x says that
the P=Q inference is false in the world "x". Now, if it can be shown
that the inference is in fact true in "x", then we have a our
contradiction in "inf" (because it is "inf" which is asserting that the
PmQ must be false in "x") Showing that the inference is indeed true in
"x" is easy: Label P with +y/x and Q with -y/x, and try to derive a
contradiction in "x". Since there is a +x at M4, the subclass relation
PnQ is true in world "x". Thus a -foo/x on Q can propagate to P, and a
+foo/x on P can propagate to Q (as with constraint ti). Doing either of
these (with the -y/x on Q or the +y/x on P) derives the contradiction.
Thus the general procedure for hacking labels at world nodes is
as follows (Refer to figure 4-3a). If a +x reaches Mi, then propagate
any +foo/x which reaches A from A to B, and propagate -foo/x from B to
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A. This works because the subclass relation is enabled in world "x". If
a -x reaches Mi, generate a sub-inference: For a new label "y", put
+y/x on A and -y/x on B. If this sub-inference produces a
contradiction, then the parent inference (which put the -x on Mi) is
also contradictory: The parent inference says that the sub-inference
must be false in world "x", but it turns out that the sub-inference is
actually true in "x". These two different processes (for +x and -x on
M1) may help explain why right-nested implications seen simpler (to me
at least) than left-nested ones.
4. 5 Logical consistency and completeness
The issues of consistency and completeness discussed here are
presented in terms of propositional logic, but the conclusions drawn
can be seen to apply to all the CEs mentioned in this appendix.
A system of inference is logically consistent iff everything
which can be inferred is true. This is usually demonstrated by showing
that the various inference rules used do not individually cause
inconsistencies, so (by induction) any combination of them also
preserves consistency. "Truth" is defined in terms of a model theory,
and then it is shown that each inference rule preserves such "truth".
Well, we do not have to go to that trouble, because the CE "inference
rules" (concerning label propagations) are themselves a direct
consequence of the "model theory" (concerning class relations). This
correspondence is shown for each constraint propagation rule (such as
ti-t4) when that rule is first presented, so there is no need to repeat
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everything here. Thus CE inference is consistent since the "inference
rules" themselves are purely model-theoretic to start with.
Logical completeness, however, is another matter entirely.
Consider the rather degenerate example in figure 4-4. Clearly A and B
are the same class (since both are the union of Ai and A2), and
similarly B and C are the same. Indeed, it is trivial to show that A
is a subclass of B (and conversely) by labeling A with +x and B with -x
(or vice-versa) and then deriving a contradiction using constraints u2
and ul. Similarly, B and C are trivially subclasses of each other by
labeling +x, -x and using constraints 12 and ii. Furthermore, it is
trivial to show that C is a subclass of A (labeling +x, -x and applying
constraints u2, ul, 12, and ii to produce a contradiction at B).
However, with the propagation scheme presented so far it is not
possible to show that A is a subclass of C. This happens because the
+x on A and the -x on C both get "blocked" -- no constraint is
immediately applicable.
Now, it is unclear whether or not structures with this "dual
blocking" property are ever encountered in practice with any
"reasonable" data-base. If it turns out that that such structures do
present a practical problem, there is a conceptually simple way to
achieve full logical completeness. However, even though this method
(about to be presented) is conceptually simple, it is computationally
disastrous even for highly-parallel hardware. The problem is that full
logical completeness always requires an exponentially-explosive
combinatorial enumeration of cases. (Karp [1972] gives strong
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mathematical evidence that a complete proof procedure for propositional
logic must always take at least exponential time). Anyhow, the super-
idiot version of the method uses the "model theoretic" approach: For a
CE network containing N+2 class-points (with 2 of them being initially
labeled), generate all 2N combinations of assigning the label +x or -x
to each of the remaining classes. Then for each of these 2N
combinations of N label assignments, see if it violates any node
constraints. If each of the combinations violate at least one
constraint, then the initial labeling is indeed contradictory. This
method is analogous, to that of doing propositional logic problems by
enumerating the entire truth-table and checking each entry.
The ordinary-idiot version of the method is still exponentially
explosive, but with a smaller explosion rate. This method involves
doing all possible label propagations until everything gets stuck. Then
pick any unlabeled point and assume x (or whatever) is in the class.
So label the point +x and finish the inference. If that wins, then
assume the point does not contain x (by labeling it with -x). Finish
the inference again, using this different assumption. Since one of
these cases must hold (x must be either in the class, or not be in it),
and since the inference wins for both cases, the inference must win in
general. The exponential explosion comes in because both of those
"finish the inference" processes may in turn themselves require the
testing of both cases of some other point, and so on recursively.
Consider applying this method to point B of figure 4-4. If B
is labeled with +x, we get the contradiction using 12 and ii; if B is
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labeled -x, we get the contradiction using u2 and ul; so we win. The
general point is that full logical completeness can be easily achieved,
if one is willing to put up with an exponential explosion. For a very
large data-base, then, it is impossible to achieve full logical
completeness anyway, so there is little point in worrying too much
about it.
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5 Functions and relations
5. 1 Binary relations: Image
The above schemes of CE inference deal only with questions of
class relations. It is only as powerful as propositional logic,
meaning that it can not handle relations in general ("Aristotle is
taller than Socrates") or any quantification beyond the simple "All X's
are Y's", "No Y's are Z's", etc.
The problem of handling general relations is of course very
basic -- even simple attribute-value systems (such as SIR [Raphael
1964]) have the ability to represent such relations, an ability which
is of course needed for a practical data-base system.
What is wanted is a way of expressing such relations in a
manner which allows inferences to be made by the same sort of local
label-propagation used in the preceding sections. The basic notion to
be used for this is that of the image of a class under a relation. For
example, "my parents' hobbies" is the class which is the image of the
class "my parents" under the relation "hobby of". We use the following
notation for such a "relation node":
* HOBBY-OF
MY-PARENTS I\I MY-PARENTS'-
* __I \ .. * HOBBIES
I/
Figure 5-0
Now, we must be very precise as to what exactly the "image" is.
Let R be the image of D under F. (In 5-0, the R is "my parent's
hobbies", the D is "my parents", and the F is "hobby of"). Consider F
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as being a class of ordered pairs <d,r>, pairing an object in the
domain and an object in the range. There is no uniqueness constraint --
many d's may map onto the same r (playing golf is a hobby of many
people), and many r's may be in the image of a single d (my father has
many hobbies). Thus F is a general relation and not just a "function"
in the sense of there being a unique object in the image for any given
object in the domain.
To insure that R is at least as big as the image, we insist
that if <d,r> is an element of F, and d is an object in D, then r must
be an object in R. That is, R contains every object which participates
in the relation F with any object in the domain. To insure that R is at
most as big as the image, we insist that for every r in R, there is a
(d,r> in F such that d is in D. That is, R does not contain any extra
objects which do not participate in the relation F with any object in
D.
Now this all may seem overly nit-picky, but in fact such a
precise definition of "image" is exactly what is needed in order to
formalize the propagation constraints for relations. (Parenthetically,
it was not particularly easy to get things to this level of crispness
-- I had the general idea of using the image under a relation for a
long time, but a useful formalization had to wait until my semantic
understanding caught up with my hacking)
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5. 2 General domain-range specification
One nice feature of using the image in the above form is that
it allows compact specification of the domain and range of a particular
relation. Domain-range is very important in a lot of applications. For
example, a business data-base might expresses that the domain and range
of the relation SUPPLIES-PART are exactly the known SUPPLIERS and
PARTS, respectively. Figure 5-1 states this fact and in addition that
that 3M (a supplier) supplies all the parts. That is, any part which
is supplied by any supplier is also supplied by 3M.
Another use for domain-range specifications is that a
programming system might use a different function for square-root
depending on whether the argument is an integer, real, or complex
number. Thus these 3 sub-functions for the different domains would
have different domain-range specifications. In general, conditional
expressions can be viewed as being conditional on the domain of the
terms in the expression: For factorial, the range is (1) when the
domain is (0,1); the range is the recursive part of the definition when
the domain is the integers > 1; the range is null when the domain is
anything else. Thus an intelligent system trying to evaluate a
factorial using such information would see which domain constraint(s)
the argument satisfies, and then do the thing specific to that domain.
5. 3 Constraint propagation
Given the above definition of the image, we want to formalize
some labeling constraints. To do this, we need a new kind of label for
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relations: Let the label +<x,y> on a relation mean that the relation
relates x and y; let -<x,y> mean that the relation definitely does not
hold between x and y. Note that these can propagate like ordinary +z
and -z labels (using ti-t4): Doing this, a relation can be treated like
any other class: For example, the relation "parent of" can be defined
as being partitioned into "mother of" and "father of". Thus we have not
introduced a new kind of label so much as a new kind of object, the
ordered pair. Now, using our definition of "image", we have these
propagation rules:
(fl) From +x on D, +<x,y> on F, infer +y on R. That is, since
R is the entire image of D under F, y must be in R if x is in D and F
relates x,y.
(f2) From +y on R, generate a new object g0037 and infer
+<g0037,y> on F and +g0037 on D. That is, since R is no larger than the
image of D under F, for every y in R there must be some domain object
which bears the relation F to it. We do not know which object this is,
so we use a new name. This is a little obscure, but will hopefully be
clarified by the examples below.
(f3) From -y on R and +x on D, infer -<x,y> on F. This is a
negation of (fl): If -y on R, then either -x on D or -<x,y> on F; thus
if also +x on D (and thus not -x on D), it must be -<x,y> on F. More
intuitively, if x is in the domain and y is not in the image, then
<x,y> can not occur in the relation.
(f4) From -y on R and +<x,y> on F, infer -x on D. This is the
other case of the negation of (fl): If -r on R, then either -x on D or
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-<x,y> on F. Since not -<x,y> on F, it must be -x on D. Again, if y is
not in the image but <x,y> is in the relation, then x can not be in the
domain (otherwise y would have to be in the image).
(f5) If D is an object (singleton class), then for +x on D and
-<x,y> on F, infer -y on R. Since D is a singleton, and since x is in
that singleton, then only x can be in the singleton. Thus if x is the
entire domain, and x does not relate to y, then y can not be anywhere
in the range.
(f6) Similarly, if F is an object (contains only a single
ordered pair), then for +<x,y> on F and -x on D, infer -y on R.
5.4 Transitive relations
As an example of making inferences using some of the above
constraints, this subsection concerns a representation for transitive
relations. The fact that "taller", for example, is transitive, tends
to be a bit of a nuisance. Either something must be built into the
system code to recognize transitive relations and treat them specially
(as in SIR and OWL), or some complex thing such as
VxVyVz[TALLER(x,y) A TALLER(y,z) m TALLER(x,z)]
must be given to a theorem prover (which may choke on it).
Since transitive relations are so common (virtually all English
adjectives, for example, have meaningful comparative forms), then I
assume that for humans they are both usefully expressive and easy to
compute with. It would be nice to have a clean formal representation
with the same feature. Consider: For most relations like "taller"
Appendix
there is associated a "quantity", in this case, "height". In common-
sense terms, A is taller than B if A's height is greater. Attempts
(such as by Schank (19721) to use this fact by assigning numerical
quantities seem very forced -- what, after all, are the measure units
for happiness, goodness, or beauty? Also, if the issue of units is
ignored by assigning a dimensionless number, then statements such as
"Joe's height is greater than Sam's happiness" would be sensible, which
they obviously are not (except in a metaphorical sense: If Joe is a
midget, it is just a cute way of saying that Sam is unhappy).
So, our scheme will be to have a relation HEIGHT (for example)
which maps from the domain PHYSICAL-OBJECTS to the range HEIGHTS. The
HEIGHTS will be ordered by the superclass relation -- if Hi, H2 are
heights, then Hi is greater than or equal to H2 iff the class Hi is a
superclass of H2. Note that these classes Hi1, H2 are not classes of
objects having some particular height -- they are classes which
represent the ordering of abstract heights. (What exactly the objects
are in those classes is unimportant. One way of looking at it is that
each abstract height is a class of tokens with numbers on them, and the
"measured height" in inches is the maximum number to be found among all
the tokens in the class. The use of maximum insures that all
superclasses of a given height must have a "measured height" at least
as big).
Since the CE inference scheme already knows about the
transitivity of "superclass", it will know about the transitivity of
"greater height" since that is represented as superclass. Figure 5-2a
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says that A is taller than B -- A's HEIGHT is a superclass of B's
HEIGHT. Similarly, figure-5-2b says that B is taller than C. Finally,
figure 5-2c represents A's height and C's height. (The "Stacking" of
relation nodes-in 5-2 means that all the stacked nodes have as their F
points the same class, in this case HEIGHT. This cuts down on the
number of crossing lines in the network diagrams). Now, the goal is to
show that A's height (point AH2) is a superclass of C's height (point
CH2). As with inferring "all redwoods are plants" (from section 2), we
label CH2 as +x and AH2 as -x. If a contradiction is obtained, then
there is no such x, so all of CH2 is contained in AH2.
Before forging ahead with the label propagations, consider
again exactly how the data-base is used. We want to test the assertion
that A is taller than C by using a data-base which presumably contains
some relevant information. Here, figures 5-2a and 5-2b represent
existing knowledge in the data-base. Figure 5-2c is new stuff which has
been built solely for the purpose of testing the assertion. In a sense,
a user who wishes to use the data-base has access to certain
"terminals" (points) in the data-base to which new stuff can be
attached. That is, it would be meaningless to ask "is A taller than C"
if the user had no access to the names A and C, about which the data-
base presumably contains some facts. Note that the user of the data-
base does not have to know anything about B, or even that B exists at
all.
Further, the user does not have to know that the heights of A
and C are already explicitly represented in the data-base (by AHI and
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CHI, respectively). In the process of label propagation, we will
implicitly infer that the points AH2 and CH2 can be identified with AHI
and CHI for the purposes of the current inference. Such identifications
can easily be made explicit and given to the user, so that in the
future the user has a more direct way of refering to A's height (using
the existing AHi) than by constructing another thing such as AH2. Using
the existing AHI and CHI is more efficient both in terms of space
(since the new stuff need not be created) and in terms of time (since
the inference that AH2 is identical to AH1 need not be rederived each
time it is needed).
Now, the inference for figure 5-2 can best be thought of as
happening in three stages: The first pushes +x from CH2 to CH1; the
second pushes it from BHC to BHA; and the third pushes it from AHI to
AH2, causing the desired contradiction since AH2 is already labeled -x.
The three stages involve using identical constraints, so it is only
necessary to explain one of them in detail. Consider the second stage:
From +x on BHC we get +<g0341,x> on HEIGHT and +g0341 on B by
constraint f2, where g0341 is some new label; then from these two
labels we immediately get +x on BHA by constraint fll Intuitively,
this happens because two different occurrences of the image of a given
class under a given relation (such as BHC and BHA both being the image
of B under HEIGHT) must be identical, thus the +x should always be able
get from one to the other. So three applications of this do all the
work, with some interstage glue being provided by constraint tl (which
gets stage one's output +x from CH1 to BHC, and gets stage two's output
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from BHA to AHi). Note that this particular inference for figure 5-2 is
by no means unique -- Just as for "all redwoods are plants", using
different constraints would produce a different inference, with the
final collision of + and - occuring at some other point in the figure.
5.5 A comparison with Codd's system and Planner
Codd [see Date I Codd 1974] proposes a "relational model" for
data-bases. Such a data-base consists of a collection of N-ary
relations, each of which is expressed as an enumerated set of N-tuples.
In the case of "normalized" relations (which is what we are concerned
with here), the slots of each N-tuple are filled with atomic data items
(such as employee names or part numbers). For all tuples in a given
relation, the i-th slot of each is filled with the same "type" of
atomic data. Thus a relational data-base can be written out as a
collection of tables: Each relation is a different table, the rows of
which each represent one N-tuple, and the columns of which are the
different slots. For example, one relation (table) might be "supplies
part", where the first slot (column) names a supplier, and the second
one names a part which the supplier supplies.
This sort of data-base scheme is conceptually very much like
the non-procedural portions of the Planner data-base [Sussman 1970],
with two major exceptions. The first is that Planner represents N-
tuples in a slightly different manner. Each tuple explicitly names the
relation of which it is a member (such as (SUPPLIES-PART 3M WIDGET)),
and data-base retrieval is done on the basis of slot position within
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the tuple instead of on the basis of the slot (column) name. That is,
Codds system can be asked for "all suppliers who supply widgets" (in
some formal notation), while Planner is asked to find all tuples which
match (SUPPLIES-PART $? WIDGET). Besides this minor notational
difference, there is a second, more important difference. This is that
Planner has slightly more expressive power. In Planner, the relation's
name (in the tuple) has the same status as any other slot, so one. can
ask for all matches against ($? 3M WIDGET), which (in a suitably
structured data-base) might mean "all relations which occur between 3M
and widgets" (for example, 3M may use or recycle or engrave widgets, in
addition to supplying them). Codd's system can not do this because a
"relation" (table) can not be used as a search key -- it 'contains'
manipulable atomic data without itself being manipulable as a unit.
This difference between Codd's system and Planner is also the
major difference between both of them and the CE representation.
Briefly, in the CE representation everything is manipulable: Classes,
objects, ordered pairs (2-tuples), relations (classes of ordered
pairs), and even the structure of the CE network itself are all
explicitly manipulable (The network structure can be manipulated by
selectively enabling different constraints via worlds). This is why the
CE representation has such a clean semantics and can represent both
statements and questions in the same manner.
Furthermore, the fact that Codd-like systems represent
everything in terms of explicitly enumerated finite sets drastically
restricts the expressive power. .Consider figure 5-1, which states that
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3M supplies all parts. To say such a thing in Codd's system would
require that the "supplies parts" table have a separate 2-tuple for
each part which 3M supplies. Even worse, if 12 different companies each
supply all of the 100 different parts, this involves 1200 table
entries. The problem is that there is no way to talk about a class of
things (such as "all parts") as a unit. In addition, the use of
explicit enumeration requires that the system have complete information
about the contents of every set: The only way to state that "all parts
which company A supplies are also supplied by company B" is to know
exactly what those parts are and explicitly list each one as being
supplied by both A and B. This clearly does not capture the expressed
generalization about all parts (as opposed to each of the currently-
known individual parts). Since the desired generalization is not
directly expressed, the system must not only generate all those table
entries to express an approximation to the general fact, but it must
examine them all if asked "does B supply all the parts which A does".
Using a CE network, both the generalization and the question are
trivial to express, using a single subclass constraint.
5.6 N-ary relations
In Codd's system, it is trivial to express N-ary relationships,
since N-tuples are a primitive of the system. Even though N-tuples are
not primitives in the CE representation presented in this appendix, it
is easy to represent them in an intuitively-satisfactory manner.
Consider an example taken from Date and Codd [1974]. They represent
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"part" as being a relation among the slots P# (part number), PNAME
(part name), COLOR, and WEIGHT. The P# is included for the purpose of
acting as a "primary key", which is something that uniquely identifies
the tuple. Now note that there is nothing that one can point to here
and say "this is a part". The thing that comes closest is the P#
(since there is a 1-1 correspondence between parts and part numbers),
but the "part number" is not the part itself. It seems to me that
individual parts can exist independently of their known attributes
(such as color, weight, and number). Of course, the tuple itself can be
considered to be the part, (with the slots giving each part's
attributes), except that there is no way in Codd's system to refer
directly to a given tuple -- that is why the "primary key" is needed as
an indexer.
In the CE representation, each part is represented explicitly,
and the various attributes are each represented as a binary relation.
Figure 5-3a enumerates some of the kinds of parts, and gives the
attribute values for widgets. Considering just the partition nodes for
the moment, note that things can be specified at exactly the desired
level of detail. It is possible to refer to all PARTS, to all of some
particular kind of part (such as all WIDGETS), and even to particular
widgets (W1, W2, W3, and W4). Note that Codd's representation is
restricted to one level of detail, since there is no representation for
higher-level groupings (classes) of objects. In this example, Codd's
system is restricted to the level of WIDGETS -- it is impossible to
refer to either a more general concept (such as PARTS), or a more
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particular one (such as W2).
Concerning the relation nodes which supply the attribute
values, note that they too can be specified at exactly the right level
of detail. Since all widgets have the same part number, part name,
color, and weight, the specification of these attributes need only be
done once (for the entire class). For example, the relation node for
COLOR-OF says that the image of the entire class of widgets under the
relation color-of is the single object "pink". That is, all widgets
have the same color. If it is desired to create a transitive partial
ordering for weights (as subsection 5.4 does for heights), Just add a
relation which maps from a particular weight (such as 3-tons) to the
class which represents the corresponding "abstract weight". (5. 4 uses a
1-level mapping from individuals to abstract heights instead of a
2-level one from individuals to individual heights to abstract heights
in order to simplify the example. The identical processing goes on in
the 2-ievel case).
Now, it is indeed possible to do the same kind of inference on
this structure as we have been doing all along. Suppose a user wishes
to know the color of part type W2. The user does not have to know that
W2 is a kind of widget, or anything else. All the user needs is access
to the network point for W2. Given this, the construction in figure
5-3b constrains the class FOO to be the color of W2. Now, label FOO
with +x -- if this +x label reaches a class, then it is known that POO
is a subclass of that class. So in particular, if +x reaches an
object, then F00 is a subclass of that object. The only way in which
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one object can be a subclass of another is if they are the same, so in
fact the object which the +x reaches must be the color of W2.
One way in which +x can get from FO0 to 'pink' is by the same
series of constraints used in each of the "stages" in section 5.4: +x
on FOO yields both +<g0342,x) on COLOR-OF and +g0342 on W2 (by
constraint f2); the +g0342 propagates from W2 to WIDGETS by constraint
tl; and finally the +g0342 on WIDGETS and the +<g0342,x> on COLOR-OF
combine to yield +x on 'pink' (by constraint fl).
5.7 Inverse relations -- "active" and "passive"
One unusual feature of the CE representation for binary
relations is that they are treated asymmetrically, For example, every
object in the range must have at least one related object in the domain
(by constraint f2), but not vice-versa. Thus there is a problem if we
need to use both the "active" and "passive" forms of a relation (such
as "the companies which supply the part" and "the parts supplied by the
company").
These two forms of a relation can be related by introducing a
new constraining node, the "inverse node". Figure 5-4 contains an
inverse node (drawn as a bisected diamond) which constrains the
relations "supplies part" and "part supplied by" to be inverses of each
other. So point A represents the class of all parts which 3M supplies,
while point B represents all the suppliers which supply a widget. This
inverse node constrains every <x,y> instance of the relation
SUPPLIES-PART to have a corresponding (y,x> instance of
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PART-SUPPLIED-BY, and vice-versa. Thus the general label propagating
constraints for an inverse node and arbitrary objects x and y are:
(vi) If +<x,y> on either side, put +<y,x> on the other.
(v2) If -<x,y> on either side, put -<y,x> on the other.
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6 Logical quantification
6. 1 Implicit quantification
With any sort of deductive inference system, processing becomes
more complex (or even impossible) when the data-base facts and queries
are allowed to contain complex logical quantifications. This section
examines how the CE representation can be extended to handle such
things (using a fair amount of brute-force enumeration, however).
But before doing this, consider what kinds of quantification
can already be handled using CEs. As seen in section 2, the constraints
embodied in the harmless-looking "partition node" need explicit
quantification in order to be represented in first-order logic.
Indeed, the intuitively simple notion of "subclass" is usually defined
by something like: "A is a subclass of B iff for all x, if x is in A
then x is in B". This explicit universal quantification is made
implicitly in the CE representation by allowing any label of the form
+x to go from A to B (by the first part of ti), and similarly for the
other propagation constraints. Thus there is a certain power of
quantification inherent in the dynamic processing (via label pushing),
which therefore does not need to be expressed explicitly in the static
representation.
For example, consider figure 6-1. The top two relation nodes
state that supplier-1 supplies both widgets and frobs (Each is a
subclass of the class of all the different kinds of parts which
supplier-i supplies). The bottom relation node represents the stuff
added for the query "what parts does supplier-i supply": The class FOO
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is exactly what we want (the entire image of supplier-i under the
relation supplies-part). So, as usual, to find relevant subclasses of
the given class FOO, we mark FOO with -x, and propagate. Any point
reached by -x is then a subclass of FOO. Since all objects (singleton
classes) obviously contain themselves, we can implicitly "hard-wire" a
permanent +supplier-1 label to the class 'supplier-1'. Then by
constraint f3 on the bottom node we can put -<supplier-l,X) on
SUPPLIES-PART. Then constraint f5 on the two top nodes produces -x on
Al and A2, respectively. Finally, constraint t2 propagates the -x from
Al and A2 to WIDGETS and FROBS, and we are done. If in addition we want
to go down to the ultimate atomic objects (such as the 4 types of
widgets in figure 5-3), then we can propagate the -x labels further.
6.2 Explicit quantification
Of course, there exist queries which are too complex to be
handled by the built-in implicit quantification mechanisms. Since the
most general way of handling a "find all" or "find one" query is to
actually construct a class which contains what is desired (and then
start a -x from it), it is first necessary to be able to construct
complex quantificational facts before being able to answer questions
about them.
Consider "FOO is the class of all suppliers each of which
supplies all parts". Now it is easy to state for a particular supplier
that the supplier supplies all parts (for example, figure 5-1), but is
not so easy to capture the general case. One possible approach is
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diagramed in figure 6-2: The subclass of suppliers (FOO) does indeed
supply all the parts. However, nothing prevents FOO from just
consisting of some supplier-A and supplier-B, which together supply all
the parts, but which individually do not. What 6-2 represents is that
"FOO is a class of suppliers, which among themselves supply all parts".
What is needed is some way to refer to a "typical" supplier
(such as 3M in figure 5-1) which individually supplies all parts, and
then say "let FOO be the class of all of those". Indeed, English makes
it clear that such a typical object exists (at least at the surface
level): In "list all suppliers such that the supplier supplies all
parts", the definite description "the supplier" clearly refers to a
typical object. OWL, in fact, is strongly biased towards the use of
such descriptions by typical example, as is Winston's [1970] scene-
analysis program.
Figure 6-3 shows the CE representation for such a typical
object. This is a copy of part of figure 5-1 (stating that 3M supplies
all parts), with the addition that the object "typ-supplier" is the
desired typical object: It, like 3M, supplies every kind of part. The
two other lines (with arrows going out of and into the node) are
respectively the desired 'destination class' of all of those objects
which behave as the typical one does, and the 'source class' from which
such objects may be drawn (in this case, from the class of suppliers).
This kind of node is called a "typ node".
Now as usual, the important point is not so much that such
typical objects can be statically represented, but that in fact some
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useful computations can be done using them. To find suppliers each of
which supply all parts, we put the customary -x on FOO, and see where
is propagates to. The way a typ node processes a -x on the
destination-class point is as follows: Enumerate objects one at a time
from the source class; for each one, test to see if it meets the
description of the typical-object; when one does, then it is a desired
object in the destination-class. To enumerate the objects in the source
class, we use the customary method of putting -y (a new label) on the
source class and noting those objects which a -y reaches. In this
case, it will reach all suppliers.
To test each such object to see if it meets the typical-object
description, assume the contrary and try to derive a contradiction. In
this case, assuming the contrary means assuming that there is a part
which the enumerated object does not supply. This is done by
generating a new label z (to represent the hypothetical part), putting
+z on PARTS, putting -(typ-supplier,z> on SUPPLIES-PART, and
temporarily "binding" typ-supplier to the enumerated object. This
"binding" means that anything which refers to typ-supplier (as a point
or a label) will really refer to the enumerated object.
As an example of this rather involved process, consider the
case when the enumerated object happens to be 3M. PARTS gets the label
+z, and SUPPLIES-PART gets -<typ-supplier,z> (which by virtue of the
"binding" is really -<3M,z>). Finally, 3M (being an object class) has
its hard-wired +3M label. Well, thank heavens we are done: Constraint
f5 applied to 3M's relation node forces a -z on PARTS, and we have the
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contradiction.
Clearly, this process is rather expensive: It involves a
brute-force enumeration and the maintenance of temporary bindings.
This is unfortunate, but there is some consolation in the fact that
other data-base formalisms have to go through pretty much the same
thing. The moral is that one must be prepared to pay a stiff
computational price if one insists on asking quantified questions.
6.3 Nested quantification
Of course, things can always get worse -- in addition to the
computational problems with doing explicit quantification at all, there
is the problem of in what order things should be done when multiple
quantifiers are used. A sufficiently high-level query language (such as
Zloof's [1974] "query by example") can remove the burden of ordering
from the naive user, but within the data-base itself the order must be
specified. (Zloof's system and the other Codd-like systems do not have
to worry about quantified facts in the data-base, because they use a
data-base containing only completely specified finite tables of atomic
facts).
Within, the CE framework presented in this appendix, the
orderings among quantified typical-objects can be made explicit by
using worlds. The "world node" used in section 4 provides an explicit
representation for all worlds in which a given subclass relation holds,
and the same principle can be applied to the "typ nodes" of this
section. Figure 6-4 shows a typ node in all its glory. The in-world
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line specifies when the constraints represented by the typ node apply
-- if +w is on the in-world then the constraints apply for labels
generated by w; if -w is on the in-world than the constraints
definitely do not apply. The out-world is a filtered subclass of the
in-world, much as the destination-class is a filtered subclass of the
source-class: +w can go from in-world to out-world iff the source
class is not empty. That is, the out-world is activated iff there is
indeed a source object to be bound to the typ-object.
Thus by chaining the out-world of one typ node to the in-world
of another, the order in which they operate can be specified: The
first node will pick a source object, bind it to the node's typ-class,
and then fire up its out-world, letting the second node now bind one of
its own source objects. This order corresponds to the "scoping" or
lexical nesting of quantifiers in mathematical logic, and indeed the
same amount of non-intuitive complexity can be produced. One simple
2-level example is shown in figure 6-5: It states that every girl who
has a brother who has a pet likes it (the pet, that is). A typ node
for which no in-world is specified is always enabled, just as the one
in figure 6-3 is. The final out-world connection to the world node
states that in all worlds in which such objects can be found (the girl,
her brother, and his pet), the pet is contained in the class of things
which the girl likes.
If this were a query to be processed (ie. "Is is true that
.... "), it would require 2 nested loops of enumerations: One for the
girls, and one for each girl's brothers. This is somewhat painful, but
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appears to be the only way to answer such questions. So the conclusion
from all this is clear: For facts and queries which can not. be handled
by the CE representation's implicit quantification, it must go through
the same kind of brute-force enumeration which the other data-base
schemes use.
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7 Summary
This appendix has presented a data-base representation based on
Constraint Expressions. It has the following features:
(1) It is highly modular, in several senses. First, the
primitives of the representation themselves are semantically modular,
in that any given fragment of CE network has the identical local
meaning regardless of context (a feature which first order logic, for
example, does not share, since a subexpression of a logical formula may
have different meanings depending upon the quantifiers within which it
is scoped). Second, the processing of inferences is computationally
modular, in that each node can be viewed as an active process which
waits for certain label patterns to appear on its attached points, and
propagates new labels when such a pattern occurs. Thus the
representation can reap the full benefits of using parallel-processing
hardware (even to the extent of actually building the data-base
expressions themselves out of cellular automata). Finally, the growth
of the power of the representation is evolutionarily modular. The
sequence of sections in this appendix corresponds to the sequence in
which the various different kinds of constraint nodes were developed.
It is important that every new increment of expressive power represents
an extension of what previously existed -- no changes in the previous
primitives have been necessary.
(2) It has great expressive power, in both the logical and
computational sense. Inferences not involving complex quantification
are easy to compute, without resorting to an exhaustive enumeration of
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cases. Of course, such an exhaustive search is needed if abstract
logical completeness is desired, but the "incomplete" system is still
extremely powerful. Also, it has great user-oriented expressive power
in that anything which can be stated as a fact to the data-base can
also be used as a query, and vice-versa. Systems based on a fully-
instantiated finite model theory (such as the non-procedural portions
of Planner, and the various Codd-like data-base schemes) do not have
this feature, and in fact are unable to express any sort of "general"
fact whatever.
Finally, it has a clean semantics. The combination of this and
(2) is very unusual: First-order logic has the semantics, but is
computationally disastrous even for small data-bases; The procedural
aspects of Planner and Conniver [Mcdermott, 19731 have the
computational power, but do not (at the current state of the art) have
any unifying semantic base. Having a clean semantics aids both the task
of implementing the primitives of the system on a computer, and that of
encoding a large data-base into the implemented representation.
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